Evolution of the nuclear deterrence theory in the US during the Cold War
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2020.108Abstract
The article examines the formation of the conceptual basis of the nuclear deterrence/containment policy. The author examines the evolution of US nuclear strategy during the Cold War period (1946–1989). American experts of nuclear deterrence theory agreed that the threat to the enemy must be realistic. The opponent must be restrained not only by the threat itself, but also by the fact that he believes in it. This was the basis of the evolution of US nuclear doctrines. The author sets out to prove three main points. First, the concept of nuclear deterrence/containment is a brainchild of the US nuclear strategy. (Other nuclear states have borrowed some particular elements of the US nuclear strategy and attempt to adapt them to their strategic policies). Second, the basis of the nuclear deterrence/containment concept was developed and tested in the USA in the latter half of the 20th century. Third, the ideas adopted during the Cold War period still determine the US nuclear strategy development, which enables us to predict its main trends. The author, also, demonstrates that, despite its aggressive stance, the US nuclear containment concept was mainly defensive. By the late 1980s, it was clear that the nuclear containment concept was undergoing a certain crisis, thus giving rise to the development of the concept of nuclear deterrence.
Keywords:
nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, missile defense, USA, USSR, cold war, air power, strategic parity, war
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References
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Published
2020-04-22
How to Cite
Fenenko, A. V. (2020). Evolution of the nuclear deterrence theory in the US during the Cold War. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International Relations, 13(1), 111–135. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2020.108
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Countries and regions of the polycentric world
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Articles of "Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
